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PRODUCTS LIABILITY AT THE THRESHOLD
OF THE LANDLORD-LESSOR
As we enter the computer age we are still far from solving
the massive accident problems that began with the industrial
revolution. The cases on products liability are emerging as early
chapters of a modem history on strict liability that will take long in
the writing. There is a wealth of analogy yet to be developed from
the exploding bottles of yesteryear, from lathes on the loose, and
capricious safety valves, and drugs with offside effects. There
are meanings for tomorrow to be drawn from their exceptional
behavior.'
Some of the meanings for tomorrow that Chief Justice Traynor
refers to above have already become chapters in the "modem history of
strict liability." The most recent chapters have extended the doctrine
of products liability to other classes of defendants and have further re-
fined its basic rationales. As Chief Justice Traynor implies, however,
each chapter not only records history; it also becomes an analogue to the
next. Chapters recently written in California and New Jersey suggest
that the next chapter may well be "The Extension of Products Liability
to the Landlord-Lessor."
It is clear that the same factors that led to strict liability within the
law of chattels are presently affecting the law of landlord-tenant. Since
the industrial revolution, the leasing of real property has become an in-
dustry that directly concerns the health and safety of millions of indi-
viduals.2 In the same period the sciences of architecture and building
maintenance have developed 3 to such a degree that an individual should
no longer have to assume greater risks as a lessee than he does as a
consumer.4 It follows, therefore, that the public policy underlying re-
1. Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Lia-
bility, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363, 376 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Traynor].
2. Twenty million households out of 52 million in 1960 were leased. Of this
figure seven million of the lessees had an income of less than $3,000. Twenty-three
percent of the total and 42 percent of the poor live in substandard units. See F.
KRISTOF, URBAN HOUSING NEEDS THROUGH THE 1980's: AN ANALYSIS AND PROJECTION,
table 14, at 31 (The National Comm'n on Urban Problems, Research Report No. 10,
1968) [hereinafter cited as HOUSING NEEDS]. Although the term "substandard" is not
particularly useful in determining what percentage have defects that would sustain a
products liability action, the considerations that determine "substandard" suggest that
such defects might be more prevalent in substandard housing.
3. See generally R. JENSEN, HIGH DENSITY LIVING (1966); E. LUNDBERG, REAL
ESTATE PRACTICE IN CALIFORNIA 230 (1965); cf. Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc.,
44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
4. The development of knowledge within a given field has been a prerequisite
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coveries for personal injury should no longer tolerate distinctions between
injuries caused by defective chattels and those caused by defective realty.
Indeed, this distinction has already begun to degenerate as the courts
recognize that there is nothing sacrosanct about the traditional law of
real property insofar as the law of torts is concerned.5
Several recent decisions, discussed in this note, strongly suggest
that there is no reason to distinguish between builders and lessors, or to
continue insulating the lessor of defective realty from the doctrine of
products liability. Elmore v. American Motors Corp.6 emphasized that
strict liability has become an independent cause of action in tort rather
than one dependent upon warranty. Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc.
7
extended the doctrine into the law of real property, and Cintrone v.
Hertz Leasing & Rental Service8 extended it to the lessor of chattels.
It would appear that a syllogistic argument could be constructed from
the holdings in these decisions; however, the logic is illusory.9 The
courts have presented nothing more than analogues leading to the con-
clusion that strict liability in tort should be applied to the landlord.
Consequently, the argument must rest on a careful analysis of the
foundations of products liability and its inherent limitations, and how it
would affect the landlord-lessor.
This note will examine both the vertical and the lateral develop-
ments of the doctrine of products liability. As will be seen, the doctrine
has been extended vertically from nonliability to strict liability in tort.
In addition, there has been a corresponding lateral movement away
from the manufacturing industry, toward, and including, a broad class
of other potential defendants. Similar developments in the law of
landlord-tenant illustrate recent attempts to meet the needs of an in-
to imposing liability. Even today there are some products that, in the present state of
human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended use.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment k (1965); see Cochran v.
Brooke, 243 Ore. 89, 409 P.2d 904 (1966) (strict liability not applicable to drug
manufacturer).
5. Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 96
(1968), abrogating traditional rules of owners and occupiers of land in favor of a gen-
eral rule of negligence. See text accompanying note 139 infra.
6. 70 A.C. 615, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1968).
7. 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965); accord, Avner v. Longridge Estates, 272
A.C.A. 695, 77 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969); Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 A.C.A.
224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969).
8. 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965); accord, McClaflin v. Bayshore Equip.
Rental Co., 274 A.C.A. 487, 79 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1969).
9. For example: Strict liability in tort is applicable to sales of chattels and
realty; strict liability in tort is applicable to the lessor of chattels; THEREFORE,
strict liability in tort is applicable to the lessor of realty. The argument fails because
the first premise is a tautology in that it presupposes that there can be no logical differ-
ence between different means of transferring property, that is, the possible differences
between leases, sales, and gifts.
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dustrial society. These developments are sufficiently analogous to raise
a very fundamental question: Will the liability of the landlord gradu-
ally continue in a vertical direction culminating in strict liability,
or will the already existing doctrine of strict liability in tort be super-
imposed as a part of the lateral development of products liability?
Products Liability
The Vertical Development
The development of the doctrine of products liability' ° has been a
vertical one highlighted by several landmark decisions. The point of
departure was Winterbottom v. Wright," which originally stood for the
proposition, inter alia, that only the express terms of a contract could
provide a basis of recovery for personal injuries resulting from a de-
fective product.' 2 Numerous exceptions to this rule developed on the
theory that certain defective products created an unacceptable degree
of danger.' 3  MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.' 4 consolidated these
decisions by recognizing that all defective products were dangerous and
by holding the manufacturer of an automobile liable for negligence
without relying on privity of contract. 5 Further developments led the
courts beyond negligence and into a form of strict liability derived from
implied warranties. Thus, by recognizing various warranties that
could be inferred from the plaintiff's contract, the courts provided a
10. For a brief history of the development of products liability, see State Stove
Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113, 115-21 (Miss. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 912
(1967). This development has been carefully followed by the leading authorities in
the law of torts. Particularly valuable, due in part to extensive citation, are Pro-
fessor Prosser's articles. Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27
MINN. L. REV. 117 (1943); Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to
the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict
Liability to the Consumer) 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Prosser,
The Fall]; Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer in California, 18 HASINGS LJ.
9 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Prosser, The Consumer]. See generally Cowan, Some
Policy Bases of Products Liability, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1077 (1965); Farnsworth, Im-
plied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 653 (1957); James,
Products Liability, 34 TExAs L. REV. 192 (1955); Lascher, Strict Liability in Tort for
Defective Products; The Road To and Past Vandermark, 38 S. CAL. L. REV. 30 (1965).
11. 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
12. Earl v. Lubbock, [19051 1 K.B. 253 (C.A.); see Huset v. J.I. Case Threshing
Mach. Co., 120 F. 865, 869 (8th Cir. 1903).
13. E.g., Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397, 57 Am. Dec. 455 (1852) (excep-
tion for a negligent druggist). See generally MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217
N.Y. 382, 385-89, 111 N.E. 1050, 1051-53 (1916) for a summary of exceptions.
14. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916);
accord, Rotche v. Buick Motor Co., 358 Ill. 507, 193 N.E. 529 (1934); Carter v.
Yardley & Co., 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693 (1946).
15. See generally Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the
Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1100 (1960); Seavey, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law
of Torts, 52 HARv. L. REv. 376, 376-78 (1939).
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new remedy in contract.' 6 Later, it was held that plaintiff could re-
cover on implied warranty in tort;"T however, privity of contract was
still required. 8
The tort action on implied warranty is adequately supported by
the rationale that the manufacturer is "holding out" his product to the
consumer, and that implicit in the product's presence on the market is a
representation that it can safely be used for its intended purpose.' 9
This implication is justified because of the manufacturer's superior
knowledge in selection of materials, design, engineering, and manu-
facturing. It is assumed that this superior knowledge induces the con-
sumer to rely on an implied representation of safety.20 Of course, since
this rationale did not depend on the existence of a contract between the
parties, it was conceptually possible for the courts to abandon the con-
tractual requirement of privity. Thus, in Spence v. Three Rivers Build-
ers & Masonry Supply, Inc. 1 the emerging doctrine of strict products
liability was applied to a manufacturer of building materials who was
not in privity of contract with the purchaser of a defective house.
The most recent refinement of the doctrine of products liability
can be found in California where the supreme court has recognized the
risk distribution rationale. This approach assumes that losses will
occur; but rather than allow fate to single out a victim to bear the en-
tire cost, it is better to place the loss on those who are most able to bear
16. See T. STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY, 389-90 (1906); Prosser,
The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MiNN. L. REv. 117 (1943). Al-
though warranty itself was originally a tort action, the contract action resulted from
Stuart v. Wilkins, 99 Eng. Rep. 15 (K.B. 1778), when plaintiff first maintained a war-
ranty action in assumpsit. This opened the door to treating warranty as a term of the
contract of sale--either express or implied. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF
TORTS 651 (3d ed. 1964). See generally Ames, History of Assumpsit, 2 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1888). The result was almost total abandonment of warranty as a tort, which
led North Carolina to hold that "[a] warranty is an element in a contract of sale and,
whether express or implied, is contractual in nature. Only a person in privity with
the warrantor may recover on the warranty; the warranty extends only to parties to
the contract of sale." Terry v. Double Cola Bottling Co., 263 N.C. 1, 3, 138 S.E.2d
753, 754 (1964). But see Byrd & Dobbs, Torts, 43 N.C.L. Rv. 906, 936 (1965);
Note, 43 N.C.L. REv. 647 (1965).
17. E.g., Greco v. S.S. Kresge Co., 277 N.Y. 26, 12 N.E.2d 557 (1938).
18. Id. at 32, 12 N.E.2d at 560; see Terry v. Double Cola Bottling Co., 263 N.C.
1, 138 S.E.2d 753 (1964) (quoted at note 16 supra); Jaeger, Warranties of Merchant-
ability and Fitness for Use: Recent Developments, 16 RUTGERS L. REv. 493 (1962);
Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.L
1099 (1960).
19. Greenman v. Yuba Ppwer Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 64, 377 P.2d 897,
901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963).
20. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69
(1960); Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
21. 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958).
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it. They, in turn, redistribute the risk of future losses to the users of
the product in the form of higher prices.22 Such an approach insures
"that the [immediate] costs of injuries resulting from defective prod-
ucts are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the mar-
ket rather than by the injured persons, who are powerless to protect
themselves."23
The risk distribution approach was first proposed by Justice Tray-
nor in 194424 and was unanimously recognized by the California court
in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.25 In that decision, the risk
distribution rationale was given as an alternative to the implied war-
ranty rationale in justifying the court's decision to abandon an action on
warranty and adopt a more refined form of products liability, strict
liability in tort. These alternative rationales for liability, however, soon
presented a new problem. If a bystander were injured by a defective
product, upholding the plaintiff's recovery would require the Califor-
nia court to choose between the implied warranty or risk distribution
rationales because of the impossibility of implying warranties in favor of
a stranger.2 6 The problem arose in Elmore v. American Motors Corp.,27
where a defective automobile left the road and injured the plaintiff
who was a stranger to the driver, the dealer and the manufacturer.
Approaching the bystander problem directly, the court held "that the
doctrine may not be limited on the theory that no representation of
safety is made to the bystander. 28  Such an injury " 'is often a per-
fectly foreseeable risk of the maker's enterprise, and the consider-
ations for imposing such risks on the maker without regard to his fault
do not stop with those who undertake to use the chattel.' "29 Clearly,
there was no reliance on the manufacturer's skill or representations,
either express or implied; rather, the bystander recovered against the
manufacturer and retailer because they had either manufactured or
placed on the market a defective product that caused injury to a hu-
22. Kessler, Products Liability, 76 YALE L.J. 887, 927 (1967).
23. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897,
901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963).
24. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461-62, 150 P.2d 436,
440-41 (1944) (concurring opinion); Justice Traynor urged this approach again in
Trust v. Arden Farms Co., 50 Cal. 2d 217, 235-36, 324 P.2d 583, 594-95 (1958)
(concurring and dissenting opinion).
25. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). Compare Traynor,
supra note 1. See also Calabres, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of
Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961).
26. Prosser, The Consumer, supra note 10, at 31-32.
27. 70 A.C. 615, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969).
28. Id. at 623, 451 P.2d at 88, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 656.
29. Id. at 623, 451 P.2d at 89, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 657, quoting F. HARPER & F.
JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 1572 n.6 (1956).
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man being.30
It would be very easy to overestimate the meaning of "a perfectly
foreseeable risk of the maker's enterprise" and conclude that the risk
distribution rationale has matured to an absolute or strict enterprise lia-
bility. This is not the case. Elmore and the cases on which it relies
are products liability cases, and each is grounded on a common fact
situation: The defendant either produced or distributed a defective
product that was the cause of the plaintiff's injury. 31 The decision is
carefully written to reflect that it falls within this context, and it re-
frains from using any complete sentence that could be construed as a
recognition of liability for any injury occasioned by the defendant's en-
terprise.32
The real importance of Elmore is that liability no longer must be
traced back to the manufacturer on the basis of an implied warranty.
This refinement is significant for two reasons. First, it clearly empha-
sizes the difference between products liability decisions which sound in
tort but are based on implied warranties, and California's pure tort
approach, which is the culmination of the vertical development. Sec-
ond, once strict liability in tort has been conceptualized as a distinct basis
of recovery for injuries resulting from defective products, it can then
be applied to realty without running afoul of the traditional rules of
the law of real property.33
The Lateral Development
Coincidental with the vertical development towards strict liability
in tort, there has been a corresponding lateral movement which has had
the effect of broadening the class of responsible defendants. Products
liability, resting on either the MacPherson doctrine of negligence 34 or the
30. Id. at 624, 451 P.2d at 89, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 657; accord, Johnson v. Standard
Brands Paint Co., 274 A.C.A. 369, 79 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1969) (ladder); Piercefield v.
Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965) (gun).
31. See Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 96, 133 N.W.2d 129,
134 (1965); Lascher, Strict Liability in Tort for Defective Products: The Road To
and Past Vandermark, 38 S. CAL. L. REV. 30, 47 (1965).
32. "The rationale of risk spreading and compensating the victim has no spe-
cial relevancy to cases involving injuries resulting from the use of defective goods ....
Thus a manufacturer would be strictly liable even in the absence of fault for an injury
to a person struck by one of the manufacturer's trucks being used in transporting his
goods to market. It seems to us that the enterprise liability rationale . . . proves too
much and that if adopted would compel us to apply the principle of strict liability in
all future cases where the loss could be distributed." Wights v. Staff Jennings, Inc.,
241 Ore. 301, 309-10, 405 P.2d 624, 628-29 (1965). For an analysis of various situa-
tions involving strict enterprise liability see Steffen, Enterprise Liability: Some Explora-
tory Comments, 17 HASTINGS L.J. 165 (1966).
33. See text accompanying note 98 infra.
34. See text accompanying notes 14-18 supra.
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doctrine of strict liability in tort, 5 has been extended to the makers 6
and assemblers37  of component parts, retail dealers,38  wholesale
dealers, 9 chattel repairmen, ° contractors, 41 builder-developers," in-
stallers,43 and lessors of chattels.44  In a recent decision 45 that relied
heavily on the financial responsibility of a lender, the California Su-
preme Court found a lending institution negligent toward various pur-
chasers when it failed to exercise reasonable control over an incompe-
tent builder who had built the plaintiffs' houses with major structural
defects.46
This lateral expansion has been influenced by the application of the
risk distribution rationale discussed earlier. For the lessor, a pertinent
example of its influence can be found in the New Jersey case of Cin-
trone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Service,4 7 where the plaintiff, an
employee of the lessee, sued for personal injuries he sustained in an
accident caused by the defective brakes of a rented truck. The trial
court dismissed plaintiff's action on strict liability. On appeal, Hertz
apparently argued that plaintiff's proof had not shown Hertz to be in the
business of leasing trucks.48  The Supreme Court of New Jersey sup-
35. E.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897,
27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963); Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d
305 (1965).
36. E.g., Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965)
(strict liability).
37. Sherward v. Virtue, 20 Cal. 2d 410, 126 P.2d 345 (1942) (negligence).
38. E.g., Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 896 (1964) (strict liability).
39. E.g., Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 44, 46 Cal. Rptr.
552 (1965) (strict liability).
40. E.g., Central & S. Truck Lines v. Westfall G.M.C. Truck, Inc., 317 S.W.2d
841 (Mo. App. 1958) (negligence); Zierer v. Daniels, 40 N.J. Super. 130, 122 A.2d
377 (App. Div. 1956) (negligence).
41. Avner v. Longridge Estates, 272 A.C.A. 695, 77 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969) (soils
engineer, strict liability).
42. E.g., Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 A.C.A. 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749
(1969) (strict liability).
43. Barth v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d 228, 71 Cal. Rptr. 306
(1968) (strict liability).
44. McNeal v. Greenberg, 40 Cal. 740, 255 P.2d 810 (1953) (lessor of tractor
liable for negligence); McClaflin v. Bayshore Equip. Rental Co., 274 A.C.A. 487, 79
Cal. Rptr. 337 (1969) (lessor of ladder held to strict liability in tort); Cintrone v.
Hertz Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965) (lessor of truck held
to strict liability in tort).
45. Connor v. Great W. Say. and Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d 609,
73 Cal. Rptr. 396 (1968).
46. With respect to other defendants see Prosser, The Fall, supra note 10; Prosser,
The Consumer, supra note 10, for extensive citations.
47. 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965).
48. See id. at 439, 212 A.2d at 785 (dissenting opinion).
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plied the missing evidence by taking judicial notice "of the growth of
the business of renting motor vehicles, trucks and pleasure cars." 9
This fact was footnoted by the court with reference to the $155 million
revenue of the Hertz Company as reported by Fortune and supported
by two of Hertz' advertising claims. 50 The court then concluded
that "warranties of fitness" arise from the transfer of possession for
a consideration;"' hence, there was no good reason for restricting
such warranties to sales as opposed to leases. The lessor of the truck
was thus held to fall within the doctrine of strict liability in tort.
The court justified the extension of strict liability in tort to the
lessor on the grounds that "one party [the lessor] is in a better position
than the other [the lessee] to know and control the condition of the
chattel transferred and to distribute the losses which may occur because
of a dangerous condition the chattel possesses."52  This recognition of
both the implied warranty and risk distribution rationales in New Jersey
provided the basis for answering the crucial question in a leasing trans-
action:
When the implied warranty or representation of fitness arises,
for how long should it be considered viable? Since the exposure of
the user and the public to harm is great if the rented vehicle fails
during ordinary use on a highway, the answer must be that it con-
tinues for the agreed rental period. The public interests involved
are justly served only by treating an obligation of that nature as an
incident of the business enterprise. The operator of the rental
business must be regarded as possessing expertise with respect
to the service life and fitness of his vehicles for use. That ex-
pertise ought to put him in a better position than the bailee to
detect or to anticipate flaws or defects or fatigue in his vehicles.
Moreover, as between bailor for hire and bailee the liability for
49. Id. at 448, 212 A.2d at 776.
50. Id. at 448 n.1, 212 A.2d at 776 n.l. Part of the court's note reads: "See
Mahoney, 'It's Hertz Itself in the Driver's Seat,' Fortune, Oct. 1963, p. 119.
'About 98 percent of [Hertz'] $155 million revenues last year came from the
short-term rental (one hour to one month) and the long-term leasing (generally two
years and up) of the 35,000 cars and 18,000 trucks that make up the Hertz-owned fleet.
Car rental brought in $77 million; the leasing and renting of trucks, $60 million; and
the long-term leasing of cars, $14 million. Hertz is the leader in all three of these
sectors of its industry, * * *
Over the past five years, industry-wide revenues increased at a startling annual
rate of some 15 percent. * * * * The company keeps maintenance costs low by
getting rid of its cars before major repairs are necessary * * *.'
The article notes that Hertz has engaged in 'aggressive, insistent advertising.' An
advertising agency devised the slogan, 'Let Hertz put you in the driver's seat,' and it
'has been dinned into the ears of TV audiences ever since.' Id. at p. 228. One can
hardly conceive of a more persuasive representation that lessees may rely on Hertz
vehicles as being fit for use."
51. Id. at 449-50, 212 A.2d at 777. For additional discussion see Farnsworth,
Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 COLuM. L. REv. 653 (1957).
52. Id. at 446, 212 A.2d at 775 (emphasis added).
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flaws or defects not discoverable by ordinary care in inspecting or
testing ought to rest with the bailor just as it rests with a manu-
facturer who buys components containing latent defects from
another maker, and installs them in the completed product, or just
as it rests with a retailer at the point of sale to the consumer.
And, with respect to failure of a rented vehicle from fatigue,
since control of the length of the lease is in the lessor, such risk is
one which, in the interest of the consuming public as well as of
the members of the public traveling the highways, ought to be
imposed on the rental business.5 3
Thus, not only did the court in Cintrone impose strict liability on the
lessor, it also extended that liability for the life of the lease as an
incident of the rental business.54
Inherent Limitations in the Doctrine
The doctrine of products liability has only been concerned with
those products that were defective when they left the control of the last
person in the marketing chain5" and that later caused the plaintiffs in-
jury.56 The doctrine is not concerned with defects that subsequently
appear.5 7 or with injuries not resulting from defects; 58 and since a
defense akin to contributory negligence or assumption of risk is per-
mitted where the plaintiff is aware of the defect, 9 the doctrine is
effectively limited to latent defects. Furthermore, the doctrine applies
only to the normal use of the product; unforeseeable uses have been
held to interrupt the chain of causation that would otherwise link the
53. Id. at 450-51, 212 A.2d at 778 (emphasis added).
54. Justice Proctor in his concurring opinion excepted from the conclusion that
the lessor should be liable for all defects arising during the lease. He would, however,
impose strict liability where, as in Cintrone, there was a covenant to repair. Id. at
460, 212 A.2d at 783. Justice Hall, dissenting, agreed that strict liability in tort should
apply to the renter of vehicles for defects existing at the time of each particular
rental, but any subsequent injuries that are occasioned by "other happenings" should
not fall within the strict liability basis. Rather, a covenant to repair should create no
greater liability than negligence. Id. at 463, 212 A.2d at 785.
55. Hurley v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 355 F.2d 517 (7th Cir. 1966) (negl;gent
flying, or defective airplane); McCurter v. Norton Co., 263 Cal. App. 2d 402, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 493 (1968); see Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168,
37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964); cf. United States Rubber Co. v. Bauer, 319 F.2d 463 (8th
Cir. 1963); Tiffin v. Great Atd. & Pac. Tea Co., 181 111. 2d 48, 162 N.E.2d 406 (1959).
56. See Gherna v. Ford Motor Co., 246 Cal. App. 2d 639, 55 Cal. Rptr. 94
(1966); Greening v. General Air-Conditioning Corp., 233 Cal. App. 2d 545, 43 Cal.
Rptr. 662 (1965).
57. See Hale v. Depaoli, 33 Cal. 2d 228, 201 P.2d 1 (1948); Darling v. Cater-
pillar Tractor Co., 171 Cal. App. 2d 713, 341 P.2d 23 (1959).
58. See Casetta v. United States Rubber Co., 260 Cal. App. 2d 792, 67 Cal.
Rptr. 645 (1968).
59. Cintrone v. Hertz Leasing & Rental Serv., 44 N.J. 434, 459, 212 A.2d 769,
782 (1965); Prosser, The Consumer, supra note 10, at 48-50.
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plaintiff's injury to the alleged defect. 60 It is important to note that
these limitations were developed from the law of torts, and that they
are distinguishable from contractual limitations, such as privity, which
were abandoned in the vertical development of the doctrine of products
liability.6
The various courts' emphasis on the difference in size or eco-
nomic stature between the two parties suggests another possible limi-
tation on the doctrine of products liability. Are small businessmen
exempted from liability, at least where the decision of the court rests on
the risk distribution rationale? The cases involving chattels have
not made such a distinction. In Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co.,62 the
court held that as a retailer engaged in the business of distributing goods
to the public, Maywood-Bell was strictly liable in tort for personal in-
juries caused by defects in cars it sold.63 No mention was made by the
court of Maywood-Bell's financial ability to withstand the loss,64 and no
reference was made to its volume of business or its insurance coverage.
The decision clearly includes the retailer of any defective product with-
out reservation for a difference in economic stature of the parties.65
In California, when the doctrine of strict liability was extended to
the lessor of chattels, the court mentioned the defendant's size merely to
prove that the defendant was in the business of leasing ladders.66 The
court mentioned that the plaintiff had used the ladder in the normal
course of his own business,67 a fact that would suggest equality of eco-
nomic stature, but that apparently had no significant bearing on the
court's decision.
From the above discussion, it is clear that the relative size of the
parties is not a limitation on the doctrine of products liability and that
it has only been used as a makeweight in initial decisions. 68 The de-
60. See Erickson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 240 Cal. App. 2d 793, 50 Cal. Rptr.
143 (1966) (alteration of ladder); Martinez v. Nichols Conveyor & Engineering Co.,
243 Cal. App. 2d 795, 52 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1966) (alteration of baling machine).
61. See Prosser, The Fall, supra note 10, at 804.
62. 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964).
63. Id. at 263, 391 P.2d at 172, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 900.
64. Consider Meyer v. Ford Motor Co., 275 A.C.A. 99, 79 Cal. Rptr. 816
(1969), where a discussion of one Ford dealer's assets in a breach of contract suit
indicated $31,000 for parts, inventories, fixtures and equipment, and a total sale price
of $65,000 constituted a fair estimate for the dealership at Elk Grove, California.
One way such a dealership could withstand a large wrongful death judgment is by a
large insurance policy. See text accompanying note 162 infra.
65. Such a limitation would be unworkable. Seeley v. White Motor Co., 63
Cal. 2d 9, 18, 403 P.2d 145, 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 23 (1965).
66. McClaflin v. Bayshore Equip. Rental Co., 274 A.C.A. 487, 494, 79 Cal.
Rptr. 337, 341 (1969); see text accompanying note 154 infra.
67. 274 A.C.A. at 490, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 338.
68. For example, in Cintrone v. Hertz Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212
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termining factor suggested by these cases lies in the character of the sale
itself. A housewife selling a jar of preserves on one occasion to a
neighbor, or a man selling his used car to a dealer are engaged in
"occasional sales," which do not give rise to strict liability.69 As Pro-
fessor Prosser observed, "no case has been found in any jurisdiction
which has imposed it upon anyone who was not engaged in the busi-
ness of supplying goods of the particular kind" normal to his business. 0
In Vandermark,71 the defendant Maywood-Bell was in the business of
selling automobiles. In McClaflin v. Bayshore Equipment Rental
Co.,7 2 the defendant maintained two signs advertising that it was in the
business of leasing ladders. The essential limitation, therefore, is not
the size of the defendant's enterprise, but that the transfer of possession
occur in the course of the defendant's business.
A New Cause of Action
The foregoing limitations, when coupled with the risk distribu-
tion rationale, further emphasize that strict liability in tort is essentially
a new basis of liability. In refining the doctrine of products liability,
the courts have made it clear that the plaintiff's new remedy is a pure
tort7 '3 rather than a hybrid derived from warranty. 74 Its limitations
A.2d 769 (1965), the court emphasized the enormous size of the Hertz leasing enter-
prise; but in Ettin v. Ava Truck Leasing, Inc., 53 N.J. 463, 251 A.2d 278 (1969),
the court followed Cintrone and applied strict liability in tort without considering
the defendant's size.
69. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment f at 350-51 (1965);
see McClaflin v. Bayshore Equip. Rental Co., 274 A.C.A. 487, 494, 79 Cal. Rptr. 337,
341 (1969) (strict liability in tort, held to be not a casual or isolated transaction).
70. Prosser, The Consumer, supra note 10 at 28.
71. See text accompanying notes 62-63 supra.
72. 274 A.C.A. 787, 79 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1969).
73. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
74. See, e.g., Delaney v. Towmotor Corp., 339 F.2d 4, 6 (2d Cir. 1964), where
in applying New York law to a gratuitous bailee there was a question whether plain-
tiff's suit was for "breach of warranty" or "strict tort liability." In California, since
its inception, the doctrine has been "strict liability in tort." Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62, 377 P.2d 897, 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 710
(1963). In New Jersey it was "principles of implied warranty." Cintrone v. Hertz
Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 449-50, 212 A.2d 769, 777 (1965). But, in
Conroy v. 10 Brewster Ave. Corp., 97 N.J. Super. 75, 82, 234 A.2d 415, 418 (App.
Div. 1967), it was the "implied warranty concept," the court apparently thinking of it
as a contract action. Previously New Jersey had attempted to clarify the question in
Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 64, 207 A.2d 305, 311 (1965) by
adopting "strict liability in tort" and citing Greenman. In a subsequent case the New
Jersey court, recognizing the confusion, put the matter this way: "'[Ilt has been
said over and over again that this warranty-if that is the name for it-is not the old
sales warranty, it is not the warranty covered by the Uniform Sales Act or the Uniform
Commercial Code. It is not a warranty of the seller to the buyer at all, but it is some-
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are not determined by its contractual origin since it is no longer subject
to the doctrines of privity75 or disclaimer,7 6 or any requirements for
notice of defect. It is not limited by inconsistencies with express
warranties, 78 and it is independent of both the Uniform Sales Act and
the Uniform Commercial Code.79  The limitations that do apply all
reflect the existence of a pure tort action--causation, abnormal use,
requirement of a defect. Cintrone clearly emphasized this departure
by recognizing that liability depends more upon transfer of possession
than transfer of title. Moreover, with the extension of protection to the
bystander in Elmore, the fundamental basis of liability itself made a
distinct change from implied representation (warranty) to risk distribu-
tion.
Thus, in its most refined form, strict liability in tort is distinguish-
able from any other tort; 0 but at this point, its full impact is not yet
thing separate and distinct which sounds in tort exclusively, and not at all in contract;
which exists apart from any contract between the parties; and which makes for strict
liability in tort.'" Rosenau v. City of New Brunswick, 51 N.J. 130, 141, 238 A.2d 169,
174-75 (1968), quoting Prosser, Spectacular Change: Products Liability in General,
36 CLEVELAND B.A.I. 149, 167-68 (1965). See also Prosser, The Consumer, supra
note 10, at 20.
75. E.g., Chapman v. Brown, 798 F. Supp. 78, 98-119 (D. Hawaii 1961), aff'd,
304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962); Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d
57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
76. E.g., Browne v. Fenestra, Inc., 375 Mich. 566, 134 N.W.2d 730 (1965);
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); see text
accompanying note 166 infra.
77. E.g., Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129
(1965); Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965); Wights
v. Staff Jennings, Inc., 241 Ore. 301, 405 P.2d 624 (1965).
78. E.g. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Weber, Inc., 252 Iowa 1289,
110 N.W.2d 449 (1961).
79. See Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 263, 391 P.2d 168,
172, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 900 (1964) (Sales Act); Rapson, Products Liability Under
Parallel Doctrines: Contracts Between the Uniform Commercial Code and Strict Lia-
bility in Tort, 19 RUTGERS L. REV. 692 (1965). The dividing line between the U.C.C.
and the tort is suggested in Seeley v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145,
45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965), as the distinction between personal injury (tort) and economic
losses (commercial warranties). Professor Franklin in When Worlds Collide: Lia-
bility Theories and Disclaimers in Defective Products Cases, 18 STAN. L. REV. 974
(1966), concludes that the U.C.C. prevents the California court from proceeding on
its tort theory entirely independent of warranty. Id. at 1002, 1016-17. However, El-
more v. American Motors, 70 A.C. 615, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969), dis-
cussed in text accompanying note 27 supra, is clearly a pure tort decision which does
not discuss limitations imposed by the California Commercial Code. What amounts
to a third approach has come from Arkansas and is explained in Sawyer v. Pioneer
Leasing Corp., 244 Ark. 943, 428 S.W.2d 46 (1968) (products liability decision hold-
ing implied warranties arising from U.C.C. apply to leases). See generally Kessler,
Products Liability, 76 YALE L.J. 887 at 902-08 (1967).
80. See Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 64, 207 A.2d 305,
311 (1965).
January 1970]
known. If it is eventually to become strict enterprise liability, the im-
pact will of course be enormous.8 More likely, the courts will refrain
from expansive definitions82 until changing social conditions necessitate
absolute liability. In the interim, the courts will carefully analyze the
consequences before extending strict liability into other enterprises; but
it does not appear that purely arbitrary limitations will be made. For
example, strict liability in tort has already made its first inroads into the
law of real property, and the decisions recognizing this extension pro-
vide a sound theoretical basis for its application to the landlord-lessor.
Products Liability in the Law of Real Property
Real Property Law of Liability
The historical development of the law of real property has been
retarded when compared to the developments occurring in other fields
of the law. Perhaps, as Professor Powell suggests in discussing the
landlord-tenant relationship, it is because this body of private law has
not been centered in the public interest as much as other branches of
the law. Since "[t]he likelihood of change or development in any
given area of the law varies directly with the number of persons af-
fected by the particular norm under consideration," and their ability
to communicate their desire for reform, little has been done.83 Al-
ternatively, this retardation may be of feudal origin if the land-owning
classes, in developing the laws of real property, adopted and maintained
principles of liability that were best suited to their own interests. 4
Whatever the historical basis, the law regarding personal injuries that
arise from defects in real property remains founded on the ancient
doctrine of caveat emptor. 5 This foundation, however, as far as it
concerns tort liability, is subject to numerous exceptions developed by
the courts in an attempt to find justice in rules adopted centuries ago
81. See Wights v. Staff Jennings, Inc., 241 Ore. 301, 405 P.2d 624 (1965) (re-
jecting risk distribution); Steffen, Enterprise Liability: Some Exploratory Comments, 17
HASTINGS L.J. 165 (1966).
82. Judge Botter, dissenting, has used language that would suggest the application
of enterprise liability to a dentist when a patient is injured, Magrine v. Spector, 100
N.J. Super. 223, 225, 241 A.2d 637, 638 (App. Div. 1967), afj'g sub nona. Margine v.
Krasnica, 94 N.J. 228, 227 A.2d 539 (Hudson County Ct. 1967). The majority deci-
sion was distinguished on similar facts in Newark v. Gimbal's Inc., 102 N.J. Super.
279, 246 A.2d 11 (App. Div. 1968).
83. 2 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY % 220, at 174 (1967).
84. Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 113, 443 P.2d 561, 564-65, 70 Cal.
Rptr. 91, 100-01 (1968). See also J. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 404-05 (3d ed.
1965) [hereinafter cited as FLEMING]; 2 F. HARPER AND F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS
1432 (1956).
85. 3A G. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
§ 1230, at 129 (repl. ed. 1959).
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by a land-oriented society.8"
In recent years, the courts have begun reevaluating the applicabil-
ity of these outdated rules and, where necessary, have recognized that
the reasons for the rules no longer exist.8 7  In certain instances the
courts have completely overthrown the old rule in favor of a better
one.88  An excellent example is the reevaluation of the liability of a
builder-vendor and the application of the new tort doctrines derived from
products liability.
Builder-Vendor Liability
Originally a conveyance of land and its structures fell under the
doctrine of caveat emptor; once the vendee took possession the builder
was not liable for personal injuries resulting from dangerous conditions
either existing at the time the vendee took possession or developing
thereafter.89  As with Winterbottom v. Wright,9 ° this rule became the
point of departure for a vertical development toward strict liability9'
that has progressed through negligence, 92 implied warranties 93 on un-
completed houses, 94 and implied warranties on completed houses.95
86. See generally id. §§ 1230-48. "[T]he number of cases which apply the rule
of caveat emptor strictly appears to be diminishing, while there is a distinct tendency
to depart therefrom, either by way of interpretation, or exception, or by simply re-
fusing to adhere to the rule where it would work injustice." 7 S. WILLISTON, CON-
TRAcTs § 926A, at 802 (3d ed. 1963); see note 101 infra.
87. For example, under the modem and enlightened view any differentiation be-
tween chattels and real structures is without support either in reason or in logic. Pas-
torelli v. Associated Eng'rs, Inc., 176 F. Supp. 159, 164 (D.R.I. 1959) (builder's
negligence).
88. E.g., Rowland v. Christian, 69 'Cal. 2d 108, 433 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97
(1968) (adopting a new rule of negligence liability to persons entering on the land).
89. Smith v. Tucker, 151 Tenn. 347, 270 S.W. 66 (1925); Bottonley v. Bannister,
[19321 1 K.B. 458.
90. 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842); see text accompanying note 11 supra.
91. See generally Bearman, Caveat Emptor in Sales of Realty-Recent Assaults
Upon the Rule, 14 VAND. L. REy. 541 (1961); Haskell, The Case for an Implied
Warranty of Quality in Sales of Real Property, 53 GEO. L.J. 633 (1965); Roberts, The
Case of the Unwary Home Buyer: The Housing Merchant Did it, 52 CORNELL L.Q.
835 (1967).
92. E.g., Dow v. Holly Mfg. Co., 49 Cal. 2d 720, 321 P.2d 736 (1958) (applying
the MacPherson doctrine to a general contractor); Totten v. Gruzen, 52 N.J. 202, 245
A.2d 1 (1968) (strict liability not pleaded, court applied negligence rule of Schipper
to all builders and contractors); Rodgers v. Scyphers, 251 S.C. 128, 161 S.E.2d 81
(1968) (applying MacPherson doctrine). See generally Brown, Building Contractor's
Liability after Completion and Acceptance, 16 Crnv.-MAR. L. REv. 193 (1967).
93. For extensive annotations see Staff v. Lido Dunes, Inc., 47 Misc. 2d 322, 262
N.Y.S.2d 544 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
94. E.g., Glisan v. Smolenske, 153 Colo. 274, 387 P.2d 260 (1963); Vanderschrier
v. Aaron, 103 Ohio App. 340, 140 N.E.2d 819 (1957); Hoye v. Century Builders, Inc.,
52 Wash. 2d 830, 329 P.2d 474 (1958); Perry v. Sharon Dev. Co., (19371 4 All. E.R.
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Unlike the vertical development within the field of products liabil-
ity, the trend towards strict liability within the builder-vendor field did
not continue with a frontal assault on privity. Strict liability came, not
through any internal development in the law of real property, but
laterally by the adoption of strict liability in tort. The leading case is
Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc.," where the New Jersey court held that a
lessee could recover against the builder-vendor because
there are no meaningful distinctions between [defendant's] mass
production and sale of homes and the mass production and sale of
automobiles . . . [T]he pertinent overriding policy considerations
are the same. That being so, the warranty or strict liability prin-
ciples of Henningsen and Santor should be carried over into the
realty field, at least in the aspect dealt with hereY7
It should be noted that strict liability in tort was superimposed
onto the law of real property without reference to the doctrine of
merger,9" which would limit the defendant's liability to the express
terms of his deed or conveyance. This leads to the conclusion that
none of the basic principles of real property need be changed by the
application of strict liability in tort.9 The builder is liable for com-
mission of a tort-building a defective building that subsequently in-
jures the plaintiff.
This conclusion is strengthened by the factual situation in Schipper.
390 (C.A.); see Roberts, The Case of the Unwary Home Buyer: The Housing Mer-
chant Did It, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 835, 838-41 (1967).
95. See Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964); Bethlahmy v.
Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966); Waggoner v. Midwestern Dev., Inc., 154
N.W.2d 803 (S.D. 1967); Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554, (Tex. 1968). See gen-
erally Haskell, The Case for an Implied Warranty of Quality in Sales of Real
Property, 53 GEO. L.J. 633 (1965).
96. 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965); accord, Avner v. Longridge Estates, 272
A.C.A. 695, 77 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969); Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 A.C.A.
224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969); see State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113
(Miss. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 912 (1967) (contractor held strictly liable for
building a house containing a defective water heater).
97. 44 N.J. at 90, 207 A.2d at 325. See note 99 infra.
98. Professor Roberts examined this doctrine and analyzed some of the methods
the courts have used in circumventing it in The Case of the Unwary Home Buyer:
The Housing Merchant Did It, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 835, 857-62 (1967).
Texas has held that the merger doctrine does not work to destroy implied cove-
nants or warranties, at least in the case of a builder-vendor. Humber v. Morton, 426
S.W.2d 554, 556 (Tex. 1968).
99. "Eichler ... argues that the doctrine [of strict liability in tort] cannot be
applied to homes or builders. We do not agree.
"[Tlhere are no meaningful distinctions between Eichler's mass production and
sale of homes and the mass production and sale of automobiles and . . . the pertinent
overriding policy considerations are the same." Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269
A.C.A. 224, 227-28, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749, 752 (1969). See text accompanying note
97 supra.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 21
STRICT LIABILITY: LANDLORD-TENANT
Plaintiff was a relative of the lessee, and the landlord was not the
original vendee. The court rejected defendant's contention that even if
strict liability is to be applied to real estate, there should still be a re-
quirement of privity. If the court had felt that the application of strict
liability in tort should be subject to the laws of real property, it could
have resorted to a rule of real property, privity of estate, and achieved
the same result. Instead, the court stated:
[ilt seems hardly conceivable that a court recognizing the modem
need for a vendee occupant's right to recover on principles of im-
plied warranty or strict liability would revivify the requirements of
privity, which is fast disappearing in the comparable products lia-
bility field, to preclude a similar right in other occupants likely
to be injured by the builder-vendor's default. 100
Thus, the holding in Schipper effectively superimposed strict liability
in tort onto the previous rules of builder liability and abrogated the
traditional immunities of builders derived from caveat emptor. 101
A recent California decision has gone even further by extending
the builder's liability to the land itself. In Avner v. Longridge Es-
tates,10 2 the plaintiffs, successors in interest to the original vendee,
sought to hold defendants (including the developer and soils engineer)
strictly liable for damage resulting from defective construction of the lot
pad upon which their home was constructed. The defective pad gave
way causing the plaintiffs' house to subside. After an extensive review
of the facts and antecedent case law the court held:
In view of the recent action of the Supreme Court in denying a hear-
ing in Kriegler, we conclude that the manufacturer of a lot may
be held strictly liable in tort for damages suffered by the owner as
a proximate result of any defects in the manufacturing process.Y0 3
It should be mentioned that the decision did not differentiate between
the economic positions of the parties; and since the soils engineer was
also held liable, it can hardly be maintained that strict liability in tort,
as suggested in Schipper,04 is necessarily restricted to mass developers
and builders.
100. 44 N.J. at 95, 207 A.2d at 328.
101. See Sabella v. Wisler, 59 Cal. 2d 21, 377 P.2d 889, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689
(1963), which was an action by a homeowner against a builder for negligence. The
builder contended that he was protected by the doctrine of caveat emptor as applied to
real property. The court did not accept this reasoning: "[Slince [the builder's] lia-
bility is predicated solely upon negligence in the construction of the dwelling, rather
than upon alleged misrepresentation or any implied warranty, it does not appear that
the doctrine of caveat emptor has any application to the instant action." Id. at 27,
377 P.2d at 893, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 693. This has also been the New Jersey approach.
See text accompanying note 97 supra.
102. 272 A.C.A. 695, 77 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969).
103. Id. at 703, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 639. The California Supreme Court has also
denied a hearing in Avner.




The development of the law of landlord-tenant shows a striking
similarity to the vertical developments in the builder-vendor and other
products liability cases. It too originally began with the same rule of
nonliability,'0° and as with its counterparts subsequent decisions have
eroded the rule so that it is now replete with exceptions and definitions.'
This development strongly suggests that the law of landlord-tenant is
approaching the point where a landlord is to be held to a standard of
reasonable care characteristic of negligence.
In California, for instance, the traditional rule of nonliability has
been stated as follows:
[U]nder the common law the general rule is that there is no liability
from the landlord either to a tenant or others for the defective
condition of the demised premises whether existing at the time of
the lease or developing thereafter. This rule applies in California
in the absence of: (1) concealment of a known danger, (2) an
express covenant to repair or a promise to repair supported by con-
sideration, or (3) a statutory duty to repair. 07
The landlord may also be liable for dangerous conditions under his
control if, by the exercise of reasonable care, he could have discovered
the defective condition and made it safe.'0 8
These statements, however, do not adequately reflect the present
law. They have been severely distorted in their definition and applica-
tion as the courts have struggled to find justice within the traditional
framework. For example, the California courts have: (1) permitted a
res ipsa loquitur instruction in a case involving a twenty year old, de-
composed and creaking common stairway, °9 thus avoiding the ques-
tion of whether a reasonable inspection could possibly have disclosed
the defect and requiring the defendant to prove that he was not negli-
gent or give a satisfactory alternative explanation; 1 0 (2) held that
105. 3A G. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
§ 1230, at 129 (repl. ed. 1959).
106. See, e.g., Coleman v. Steinberg, 54 N.J. 58, 253 A.2d 167 (1969), affirming
a reversal for the plaintiff and holding that a common standing radiator may consti-
tute a latent defect where the plaintiff is burned by coming into contact with the
input pipe and that it presents a question of fact for the jury; Strothman v. Houggy,
186 Pa. Super. 638, 142 A.2d 769 (1958) (latent defect in design of mantel).
107. Del Pino v. Gualtieri, 265 Cal. App. 2d 912, 919-20, 71 Cal. Rptr. 716, 721
(1968).
108. Burks v. Blackman, 52 Cal. 2d 715, 718, 344 P.2d 301, 304 (1959); Harris
v. Joffe, 28 Cal. 2d 418, 170 P.2d 454 (1946).
109. DiMare v. Cresci, 58 Cal. 2d 292, 373 P.2d 860, 23 Cal. Rptr. 772 (1962).
110. Id. at 302-03, 373 P.2d at 866-67, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 778-79 (McComb, J.,
dissenting).
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even though a stairway had been used exclusively by the tenant, the
jury, rather than the court, must determine whether it was a common
stairway;111 (3) recognized that a lessor is bound to use a high degree
of care for elevators and that this duty cannot be delegated to an inde-
pendent contractor;1 2 (4) held that a new lessee was really an "invitee"
rather than a "licensee" in the use of certain common facilities, thus al-
lowing recovery against the landlord;"13 (5) held that it was a question
of fact whether a ladder leading to a roof was a common stairway;"14
(6) held that a landlord may be liable for concealing a latent defect even
though he does not know the defect exists but only has reason to sus-
pect its existence. 115
A particularly interesting example of the court's efforts to find
grounds for recovery arose when a tenant was injured because of an
improperly designed stairway while escaping from a fire. Seemingly,
he would have been prevented from recovering because an exculpatory
provision in his lease disclaimed liability for injuries resulting from the
landlord's failure to disclose a known, latent defect.1 6 In allowing
recovery the court held that because the landlord's employees had on
occasion made repairs in the apartment itself, the apartment fell
within the "safe place" provision of the Labor Code. This being true,
the only stairway leading to the apartment was also held to be within
the Labor Code. Since the stairway was improperly designed, it con-
stituted a defect and was, consequently, in violation of the Labor Code.
Since the court also held that the violation of a safety statute could not
be disclaimed, the exculpatory provision was ineffective. Thus, the
violation created a presumption that the landlord was negligent in main-
taining a defective stairway. Although the tenant was not an employee,
111. Burks v. Blackman, 52 Cal. 2d 715, 344 P.2d 301 (1959).
112. Brown v. George Pepperdine Foundation, 23 Cal. 2d 256, 143 P.2d 929
(1943); Hollander v. Wilson Estate Co., 214 Cal. 582, 7 P.2d 177 (1932).
113. Keane v. McIndoe, 93 Cal. App. 2d 82, 207 P.2d 1059 (1949).
114. It would seem that as a matter of law this clearly would not be a common
stairway, since the tenant's only justification for use would be to trespass on the land-
lord's roof. Fantacone v. McQueen, 196 Cal. App. 2d 477, 16 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1961).
115. Anderson v. Shuman, 257 Cal. App. 2d 272, 64 Cal. Rptr. 662 (1967), where
the fact that the landlord knew one sink had become loose and three or four others
were loose in a 40 unit building constituted actual knowledge that plaintiff's sink
was also defective. Such a holding was necessary because constructive knowledge
would be insufficient to support a recovery under California law. But see Daulton v.
Williams, 81 Cal. App. 2d 70, 72, 183 P.2d 325, 326 (1947): "[T]he fact that other
units had broken is not proof that the handle on appellant's bathtub was defective."
116. Haliday v. Greene, 244 Cal. App. 2d 482, 53 Cal. Rptr. 267 (1966). Strict
liability in tort was pleaded but rejected by the court. While not willing to make new
law, the court was able to provide plaintiff with a recovery. The strict liability
holding was questioned in Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 A.C.A. 224, 74 Cal.
Rptr. 749 (1969); accord, Avner v. Longridge Estates, 272 A.C.A. 695, 77 Cal. Rptr.
633 (1969).
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the court held that he was nevertheless within the class intended to be
protected and could have the advantage of the presumption in proving
negligence.11 7
The net effect of the above decisions has been to distort the mean-
ling and application of the so-called "black letter law." This in itself,
however, is not the problem; the problem arises because these distortions
eventually recur and require further extensions"' or definitions. 19  Of
course, not all cases are decided for the tenant, but an analysis of the
cases indicates that the fundamental objective of the courts is to hold
the landlord liable on the basis of negligence when his is the greater
fault. 2 1
Additionally, because the present law does not require the land-
lord to inspect for latent defects, some courts in their effort to provide a
basis for recovery have found an implied warranty of habitability, some-
times called the "furnished house exception.' 1 2 1 The leading case came
from an English court,1 22 which reviewed previous defenses to actions for
rent and concluded that "[t]he result of the decisions as a whole seems to
be that there is an absolute contractual warranty in the nature of a con-
dition by the person who lets a furnished house or lodging to the effect
that the premises and furniture are fit for habitation."' 23
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in adopting this view and holding
that a breach of the implied warranty of habitability constituted a
constructive eviction, 24 used even broader language and stated:
117. Such an approach is not unprecedented. See Schumann v. C.R. Riechel
Eng'r Co., 187 Cal. App. 2d 309, 9 Cal. Rptr. 486 (1960) and cases cited therein which
hold that the General Industry Safety Orders provide a standard of care for employees
and tenants. In each case the statute was relied upon to overcome the immunities of
owners and occupiers of land.
118. Compare Fisher v. Pennington, 116 Cal. App. 248, 2 P.2d 518 (1931), with
Forrester v. Hoover Hotel & Inv. Co., 87 Cal. App. 2d 226, 196 P.2d 825 (1948), and
Lee v. Giosso, 237 Cal. App. 2d 246, 46 Cal. Rptr. 803 (1965), where the plaintiffs
were injured by falling wall beds and sued on an implied warranty of personalty even
though the beds were affixed permanently to the realty. The cases are distinguishable
by the different length of the tenancies, Lee v. Giosso, supra.
119. The definition of a "latent" defect, for instance, is a perplexing one; see
Merrill v. Buck, 58 Cal. 2d 552, 375 P.2d 304, 25 Cal. Rptr. 456 (1962), and cases
cited therein; Couch v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 80 Cal. App. 2d 857, 183 P.2d 91
(1947) (exposed electrical wires that were known to plaintiffs).
120. "Significantly, almost all reported decisions favorable to landlords involved
situations where the tenant was either aware or could have discovered the dangerous
condition." FLEMING, supra note 84, at 449; see Cummings v. Prater, 95 Ariz. 20, 386
P.2d 27 (1963); Wilcox v. Hines, 100 Tenn. 538, 46 S.W. 297 (1898).
121. Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 595, 111 N.W.2d 409, 412 (1961);
Skillern, Implied Warranties in Leases: The Need for Change, 44 DENVER L.J. 387,
391-92 (1967).
122. Collins v. Hopkins, [1923] 2 K.B. 617.
123. Id. at 620; accord, Ingalls v. Hobbs, 156 Mass. 348, 31 N.E. 286 (1892).
124. Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961); accord, Reste
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To follow the old rule of no implied warranty of habitability in
leases would, in our opinion, be inconsistent with the current legis-
lative policy concerning housing standards. The need and social
desirability of adequate housing for people in this era of rapid popu-
lation increases is too important to be rebuffed by that obnoxious
legal clich6, caveat emptor. Permitting landlords to rent "tumble-
down" houses is at least a contributing cause of such problems as
urban blight, juvenile delinquency and high property taxes for con-
scientious landowners. 12
5
Obviously this rationale closely parallels that used in the early develop-
ment of implied warranties in the vertical development of the products
liability case.121 Of course, once the warranty is recognized, it can
support a claim for personal injury. 27
Courts have also circumvented the common law rule by finding
violations of statutes, 28 ordinances, 2 and building codes3 ° that may
come within the doctrine of negligence per se.1"' California, by stat-
ute, has imposed a requirement that the premises be habitable and has
established a specific duty to repair;'32 however, it was narrowly
construed at an early date to prohibit recovery for personal injury.s
It should be noted that in England, where the rule of nonliability
originated, the contemporary view has been convincing; and in most
Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969); see Buckner v. Azulai,
251 Cal. App. 2d 1013, 59 Cal. Rptr. 806 (Super. Ct. App. Dep't 1967).
125. 14 Wis. 2d at 596, 111 N.W.2d at 412-13; cf. Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). See also Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91
Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966) (exhaustive opinion finding implied warranties in real
estate).
126. See text accompanying notes 10-18 supra.
127. Fisher v. Pennington, 116 Cal. App. 248, 2 P.2d 518 (1931); Hacker v.
Nitschke, 310 Mass. 754, 39 N.E.2d 644 (1942). But cf. Stowe v. Fritzie Hotels, Inc.,
44 Cal. 2d 416, 282 P.2d 890 (1955).
128. E.g., Ewing v. Balan, 168 Cal. App. 2d 619, 336 P.2d 561 (1959) (violation
of state housing act on gas appliances).
129. E.g., Grant v. Hipsher, 257 Cal. App. 2d 375, 64 Cal. Rptr. 892 (1967)
(county ordinance on swimming pools).
130. E.g., Merrill v. Buck, 58 Cal. 2d 252, 375 P.2d 304, 25 Cal. Rptr. 456 (1962)
(Los Angeles building code on stairways).
131. The majority view is contra; violations are considered to be irrelevant in
determining liability. See F. GRAD, LEGAL REMEDIES FOR HOUSING CODE VIOLATIONS
115 (The National Comm'n on Urban Problems, Research Report No. 14, 1968), and
cases cited therein.
132. "The lessor of a building intended for the occupation of human beings must,
in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, put it into a condition fit for such
occupation, and repair all subsequent dilapidations thereof, which render it untenant-
able. . . ." CAL. CIV. CODE § 1941. See id. § 1942.
133. See Gately v. Campbell, 124 Cal. 520, 57 P. 567 (1899); Note, The Duty of
Maintenance of Multiple Dwellings in California, 18 STAN. L. REV. 1397, 1399, 1402-04
(1966). But see Buckner v. Azulai, 251 Cal. App. 2d 1013, 59 Cal. Rptr. 806 (Super.
CL ADD. Dep't 1967) (legislative intent).
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cases, recovery for personal injury is assured. The Housing Act of
1957,"' the scope of which is much more comprehensive than tort lia-
bility, provides that for housing rented for up to 80 pounds in the
Administrative County of London and 52 pounds elsewhere "there
shall, notwithstanding any stipulation to the contrary, be implied a
condition [in the leasing contract] that the house is at the commence-
ment of the tenancy, and an undertaking that the house will be kept by
the landlord during the tenancy, fit for human habitation."135  If this
warranty is breached by the landlord and injury results, the tenant can
recover damages.136 Thus England is neither burdened with the need
for torturing fact situations into exceptions to the rule of nonliability
nor burdened with the necessity for implying warranties between con-
tracting parties.
All of these departures. particularly the negligence and implied
warranty decisions, clearly illustrate both the vertical development
from the original rule of nonliability and the close parallel to the cor-
responding developments that preceded the application of strict liability
to the manufacturer of chattels and to the builder-vendor. As the
courts continue evaluating new fact situations in landlord-tenant cases.
it can be expected that they will turn more often to the products liability
decisions and their rationales. The question is whether the courts will
continue this vertical development of the law of landlord-tenant by
recognizing the existence of a broad doctrine of negligence as in Mac-
Pherson, or whether they will skip over this phase of the vertical de-
velopment and recognize that the doctrine of products liability should
be superimposed onto the law of landlord-tenant, as it was onto that of
the builder-vendor.137
Negligence?
From the foregoing discussion it is obvious that California is close
to answering this question and that it can reasonably be argued that a
negligence rule is in fact the existing law, at least in the area of latent
defects. 3 This argument is based on the examples of the courts' inter-
pretations cited above and is substantially strengthened by the supreme
court's landmark decision in Rowland v. Christian."' In that case the
court overthrew the previous distinctions between licensees, invitees,
134. 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 56, at 770.
135. Id. § 6(2), at 780.
136. See id. § 4(1), at 778-79, for a listing of factors that determine habitability;
for example, state of repair, condition of drainage and sanitary conveniences; 23
HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND fI 1249-53, at 574 (1958).
137. See text accompanying note 97 supra.
138. See Wilcox v. Hines, 100 Tenn. 538, 557, 46 S.W. 297, 302 (1898) (land-
lord's duty of reasonable care and diligence in discovering defects).
139. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
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and social guests as anachronisms of the law of real property ill-suited
to a modem, urban society. 4 ' In holding that negligence was the proper
rule for occupiers of land, the court faced problems similar to the ones
concerning the landlord-tenant relationship. The law pertaining to
occupiers of land had also been subjected to varying interpretations
similar to the examples discussed above. 141 Rather than recognize
one more variation, the court in Rowland v. Christian held that section
1714 of the California Civil Code 42 applied; and unlike the common
law, which recognizes only certain relationships as creating a duty of
care, this section imposes a general duty on all men. It is suggested that
this is equally true of the landlord. Thus, the court's decision to adopt
a negligence rule in California could rest either on section 1714 or upon
the argument that the common law has evolved such a duty with respect
to latent defects. 43
StAict Liability?
The doctrine of strict liability in tort, however, has developed be-
yond negligence, and all of the reasons the courts have advanced in its
development are equally applicable to the landlord-tenant relationship.
The application, however, need not depend on the risk distribution
rationale of Elmore but can rest upon the same reasons that generated the
original products liability decisions-an implied representation of safety
to a person who cannot make, or be expected to make, a meaningful in-
spection.
For example, many of the potential defendants closely parallel the
status of the Hertz Leasing Company' and are engaged in the enter-
140. Compare Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 259 (1960) (search and seiz-
ure); Kermaree v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 630-32 (1960)
(refusing to adopt such distinctions in admiralty).
141. Compare the court's discussion of the "trap" exception, i.e., a dangerous con-
dition known to the occupier and unknown to the licensee, with text accompanying
notes 111-19 supra.
142. "Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also
for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the manage-
ment of his property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of
ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself . . . ." This is not an unusual statute.
See, e.g., S.D. COMp. LAWS § 20-9-1 (1967).
143. Professor Fleming arrives at the same conclusion but argues that since the
lessor is presently held liable for "active negligence" after the commencement of the
lease, fairness and reason alike demand no lesser obligation in relation to the lessor's
activities that create dangers before the term began. FLEMING, supra note 84, at 405-06.
144. See note 50 supra. As to other corporations who have become landlords see
Beaton, Corporate Investments in Real Estate, THE REAL ESTATE APPRAISER, July-Aug.,
1969, at 37 (listing inter alia, Gulf Oil, Westinghouse, Chrysler, Chase Manhattan
Bank); Cross, The House the Janitors Built, FORTUNE, Nov., 1962, at 152. (Ma-
rina City in Chicago, 18 floors of parking, 896 apartments, $36 million development
owned by a labor union).
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prise of leasing realty, presumably because such a business will return
a greater net profit. 14  Their advertising claims in the mass media
emphasize the convenience of renting, central locations, luxurious sur-
roundings, recreational facilities and "carefree living."'1 46  In the
leasing negotiations every attempt is made to lure the prospective tenant
145. The net profit is twice that of common stocks. Other investment advantages
are "tax-free" income under depreciation allowances, possible equity appreciation, and
the availability of leverage for increasing the yield. See E. LUNDBERG, REAL ESTATE
PRACTICE IN CALIFORNIA 206-43 (1965); M. UNGER, REAL ESTATE PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICES 3-45, 501-22 (1964). This is particularly true for those lessors who main-
tain the greatest number of defective premises for, as Sax and Heistand note: "It is
not without relevance that observers quite uniformly find the slum housing business to
be quite a profitable one. To be sure, quite another story is told by landlords, but on
examination one sees that the landlords ordinarily measure profitability only by con-
trasting income and expenses over a given period, failing to consider that slum housing
is often an investment where the real profits may be made through sales which take
advantage of such tax devices as depreciation. Alternatively, the management of the
slum dwelling may be a holding operation through which the owner keeps his head
above water while he waits for land values to rise and bring him his profit. [One
authority] found that slum properties are sometimes part of a falling real estate market,
but this simply intensifies the pressure for rental profits, generally through reduced
maintenance. Moreover, it is not a cause for sympathy that some buyers of slum
properties, through lack of experience or through ignorance, find themselves losing
money; like the small speculator in the stock market who finds himself overwhelmed
by bigger sharks, the losing slum owner may simply be the victim of his own greed.
The potential defendants in these cases are not those who invest in limited dividend
low-cost housing enterprises, seeking a very modest return on their money, but rather
they are those who seek, and often get, large profits. While it may be true that
many slum owners are themselves 'little fellows' rather than tycoons with thousands
of properties, this hardly seems a basis for sympathetic treatment. It is a common and
unfortunate fact that the dirtiest work of exploitation is frequently left to small-timers,
with the owners of great capital able to make satisfactory profits in more respectable
investments. This simply proves that one with a million dollars can invest in bonds
and make a comfortable living clipping coupons, while the fellow with a few thousand
dollars must get his hands dirty if he wants to produce a satisfactory income from his
capital. But it is well to remember that not all small investors find themselves com-
pelled to get rich quickly, and it remains to be shown why those who have such desires
ought to be permitted to fulfill them at the expense of the poorest people in society."
Sax & Hiestand, Slumlordism as a Tort, 65 MICH. L. REV. 869, 892-93 n.93 (1967)
(extensive citation omitted).
146. See the rental property advertisements in any metropolitan newspaper. For
example, without emphasizing different type sizes, the following excerpts from adver-
tisements appearing in the San Francisco Examiner-Chronicle, September 28, 1969
(Want Ad Section), at 19, col. 2, 4, promise: "Air-conditioning, patios, balconies, Hot-
point kitchens, fireplaces, pools, club houses, saunas, tennis courts, assigned parking,
small pets allowed, 1-2-3 bedrooms for adult living from $215"; "garden apartments,
a [developer's name deleted] development in Main County's most distinctive area
with views of wooded hills, Mt. Tamalpais and the Bay. Carefree living only minutes
North of the Golden Gate Bridge. Completely maintained gardens and landscaped
areas. Two swim pools, one Olympic size, and tennis courts. Units furnished or
unfurnished" (emphasis added).
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into accepting the premises at face value, 147 and even assuming the tenant
is competent to do so, it is unrealistic to presume that he ever makes a
meaningful inspection either of the premises or the central facilities,
such as hot water heaters, furnaces, or air conditioning systems. 4 ' A
prospective tenant's inspection, as the advertisements suggest, is for
suitability-size, location, and livability.149  Further, building code re-
quirements and violations are made known to the lessor, not to the
lessee; the lessee reasonably assumes that the landlord is in the leasing
business because of his superior knowledge and ability and that the
premises are safe for occupancy by those seeking the "carefree life." 50
Therefore, where the injured tenant has justifiably relied on the lessor's
skill and his implied representation that the premises are habitable, the
public interest is best served when the lessor is held liable for breach of
his warranty.' 5 '
An additional reason, particularly pertinent since Elmore, is de-
rived from the risk distribution rationale. The lessor's business de-
pends on one of man's basic needs-shelter; and where a defect
creates a risk of injury, "the financial burden is best placed upon the
landlord, who receives a benefit from the transaction in the form of
147. "When you go with the prospective tenant to the building, it is just common
sense to have warned the janitor [i.e., the resident manager] beforehand to try to
make things look as spruce as possible. Have the lease in your hand, made out in
duplicate and all ready for signature. It is a good idea to whip people through the
empty apartment and then go to the janitor's apartment where it is more comfortable
to do your bargaining. This makes certain that the bargaining is done by the tenant
with only the memory of the apartment in his mind, not the actuality before his eyes.
As soon as you can make your bargain, do not delay but get the lease signed in dupli-
,cate before witnesses, and get a cash payment for all or part of the first month's
rent." J. BROWN, THE INTELLIGENT INVESTOR'S GUIDE TO REAL ESTATE 231 (1964).
148. See Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 451-52, 251 A.2d 268, 272
(1969); Skillern, Implied Warranties in Leases: The Need for Change, 44 DENVER
L.J. 387, 393-94 (1967); cf. Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 91, 207 A.2d 314,
325-26 (1965).
149. Cf. J. BROWN, THE INTELLIGENT INVESTOR'S GUIDE TO REAL ESTATE, 231
(1964); see note 147 supra.
150. "It has come to be recognized that ordinarily the lessee does not have as
much knowledge of the condition of the premises as the lessor. Building code re-
quirements and violations are known or made known to the lessor, not the lessee. He
is in a better position to know of latent defects, structural and otherwise, in a building
which might go unnoticed by a lessee who rarely has sufficient knowledge or expertise
to see or discover them. A prospective lessee . . . cannot be expected to know if the
plumbing or wiring systems are adequate or conform to local codes. Nor should he
be expected to hire experts to advise him. Ordinarily all this information should be
considered readily available to the lessor...." Reste Realty Co. v. Cooper, 53 N.J.
444, 452, 251 A.2d 268, 272 (1969); cf. Anderson v. Shuman, 257 Cal. App. 2d 272,
64 Cal. Rptr. 662 (1967).
151. Cf. Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 NJ. 70, 91, 207 A.2d 314, 326
(1965) (similar language as to a developer).
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rent. ' 152 As Justice Traynor has explained:
[T]he cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may be an
overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one,
for the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and
distributed among the public as a cost of doing business ...
Against such a risk there should be a general and constant pro-
tection, and the manufacturer is best suited to afford such pro-
tection. 15 3
In the area of chattels, this liability has been properly extended to the
lessor since he
may be the only member of that enterprise reasonably available
to the injured plaintiff, . . . and the imposition of strict liability
upon him serves, as in the case of the retailer, as an incentive to
safety. This will afford maximum protection to the injured plain-
tiff while working no injustice upon the lessor: the latter can re-
cover the cost of protection by charging for it in his business.154
These factors lead to the conclusion that since builder-developers are
strictly liable for defective realty, lessors of realty should also be strictly
liable.' 55
The Application of the Doctrine
As noted before, the doctrine of strict liability in tort is not uni-
versally applied within the field of chattels. For example, not all sales
are subject to the doctrine, only those where the seller is engaged in the
business of selling the product. 15' With the expansion of the doctrine to
152. Anderson v. Shuman, 257 Cal. App. 2d 272, 275, 64 Cal. Rptr. 662, 665
(1967) (holding lessor liable for failure to disclose a latent defect). In a footnote the
court elaborated: "This reasoning is not dissimilar to the rationale expressed motivat-
ing the modern rule of liability in the products liability cases." Id. at 275 n.3, 64
Cal. Rptr. at 665 n.3 (citing Greenman).
153. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441
(1944) (concurring opinion).
154. McClaflin v. Bayshore Equip. Rental Co., 274 A.C.A. 487, 493, 79 Cal. Rptr.
337, 340 (1969) (lessor of a used ladder held to strict liability in tort).
155. This argument has already been presented to two New Jersey courts, both
of which found for the plaintiff on other grounds. In Conroy v. 10 Brewster Ave.
Corp., 97 N.J. Super. 75, 234 A.2d 415 (App. Div. 1967) it was not applicable because
the lease was an "isolated transaction." Apparently the defendant was not in the
leasi.,g business. Perhaps this result was due to a failure in the plaintiff's proof because
the corporate nature of the defendant would suggest that it was "in the business" of
leasing houses. See text accompanying note 158 infra. The second case, Ellis v.
Caprice, 96 N.J. Super. 539, 233 A.2d 654 (App. Div. 1967), held the doctrine could
not be applied because it had not been pleaded in the complaint or set up as an issue in
the pretrial order. "Aside from this, we are not persuaded that the facts of this case
[a six year old child playing with matches] bring it within the ambit of the Cintrone-
Schipper rationale." Id. at 556, 233 A.2d at 663.




lessors this phraseology might present some difficulty since it could be
argued that, since he receives a consideration, every lessor is, prima
facie, "in the business" of leasing. The limitation, however, is based
on the notion that a point can be reached where the number of
transactions do not warrant application of the doctrine. Thus, if an
individual were to sell his home the doctrine would not apply.157  The
same result should obtain if the individual were to lease his home, be-
cause like the sale of a single home, there is no undertaking to the pub-
lic in general nor a justified reliance on such an undertaking by the
ultimate lessee.158  The application, therefore, would exclude those les-
sors who were not "in the business." Such a limitation would be deter-
mined by the courts just as "in the scope of" is determined in respondeat
superior, and "arising out of and in the course of" is determined in
workmen's compensation. Indeed, one court has already held that
the lessor of a two unit dwelling is not "in the business." 5 9
Once it is established that a lessor is "in the business," the eco-
nomic stature or size of his business would not provide a basis for limit-
ing liability. This too is only logical since, as noted previously, 6 ° there
is no such limitation in the products liability decisions. It must be
emphasized that the rationale of the tort does not rest on the financial
strength or bargaining power of the parties to the particular transaction;
it rests on the risk distribution theory as defined in Greenman.161 Thus
the economic basis of the doctrine, particularly with the bystander
refinement added by Elmore, would be equally applicable to the small
landlord who is in the same business as his larger competitor.
While none of the products liability decisions rest on the ground
that the defendant is insured or insurable, they do specifically mention
insurance as a vehicle for spreading the risk.162 In effect the courts are
recognizing that if physical harm cannot be avoided,
157. Waggoner v. Midwestern Dev., Inc., 154 N.W.2d 803, 807 (S.D. 1967)
(dictum).
158. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment f at 350 (1965);
Prosser, The Consumer, supra note 10, at 28.
159. Conroy v. 10 Brewster Ave. Corp., 97 N.J. Super. 75, 234 A.2d 415 (App.
Div. 1967). While reversing in favor of the lessee, the court held that a lessee in
a two unit dwelling could not recover on principles of strict liability against the land-
lord because the doctrine was not to be applied to cases involving isolated sales or
leases.
160. See text accompanying note 61 supra.
161. Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 18-19, 403 P.2d 145, 151, 45 Cal.
Rptr. 17, 23 (1965).
162. Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965): "[Plublic
policy demands that the burden of accidental injuries . . . be treated as a cost of pro-
duction against which liability insurance can be obtained . . . ." Id. at 87, 207 A.2d
at 323. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment c at 350 (1965); text
accompanying notes 153-54, supra.
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at least the shock effect of the loss can be minimized by spread-
ing the consequences among a large number of people through
insurance and resulting price increases. Moreover, the courts have
undoubtably realized not only that the vast majority of individual
victims could not spread this as well as the defendants but also that
the victims could not bear it at all.163
It could be argued that strict liability for defects should not be imposed
since some landlords, particularly those maintaining tenements in ghetto
areas, would have difficulty in obtaining insurance at competitive rates.
This argument fails for two reasons: (1) Regardless of insurability,
there is no overriding social or economic justification for protecting
landlords who maintain defective premises as opposed to the policy
enunciated in the products liability decisions of protecting the faultless
plaintiff. G0  (2) Products liability insurance rates are determined on
the anticipated number of losses among the broad base of insureds."6 5
If one group of insureds maintain their premises in such a condition
that insurance rates are prohibitive, they should be compelled to con-
trol the number of defects and to bring the premises up to an accept-
able standard for insurability. This would, of course, have the effect
of diminishing the risk of injury and, consequently, the insurance rates.
This element of control by the lessor is identical to that of the manu-
facturer in the products liability decisions; it does not seem unjust to
compel the lessor to exercise his control to protect lives and property.
An agreement between the parties would not prevent the appli-
cation of the doctrine of products liability because the liability does not
arise from the agreement. 66 That is to say, liability arises from the
delivery of defective premises and would not be affected by the agree-
ment or its contractual provisions6 7 even though it is a conveyance of
real property.6 8
The lease may, however, attempt to regulate the parties' liability in
the form of a disclaimer or an indemnification agreement. Such clauses
would not prevent the application of strict liability in tort since liability
is not created by the contract but is imposed by law." 9 Once a defect
163. Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimers in De-
fective Product Cases, 18 STAN. L. REv. 974, 1009 (1966).
164. See text accompanying note 209 infra.
165. See Morris, Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process-The Insignificance
of Foresight, 70 YALE L.J. 554, 570 (1961).
166. Restriction of contractual liability is immaterial. Vandermark v. Ford
Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 263, 391 P.2d 168, 172, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 900 (1964).
167. See id.; Read v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 264 Cal. App. 2d 404, 70 Cal. Rptr.
454 (1968).
168. See text accompanying notes 96-97 supra.
169. See, e.g., Crane v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 218 Cal. App. 2d 855, 860, 32 Cal.
Rptr. 754, 757 (1963).
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causes injury, liability arises. It is at that point, however, that the
contractual agreement might become pertinent, and its effect evaluated
by the court.171 It is clear that liability for personal injury cannot be
disclaimed; one purpose of strict liability in tort is to prevent a manu-
facturer from defining the scope of his responsibility for harm caused
by defective products. 7 1 While indemnification agreements have not
been adequately evaluated in products liability decisions, 173 it seems
probable that such clauses would be effective174 unless voided under
public policy as adhesive. 75
Practical Limitations on the Landlord's Liability
It is clear from the products liability decisions that the defendant
is not an insurer of the consumer's safety. 7 6 The tenant's injury would
have to result from a defect 7 7 and his recovery would be subject to the
definitions and defenses developed in products liability decisions. 17
The test is not perfection, it is reasonableness. This means that the
building or premises would have to be reasonably safe for the purposes
for which they are sold or leased. 70
170. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897,
27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
171. Markley v. Beagle, 66 Cal. 2d 951, 429 P.2d 129, 59 Cal. Rptr. 809 (1967)
(contract controls, not the doctrine of equitable indemnity).
172. Seeley v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 17, 403 P.2d 145, 150, 45 Cal.
Rptr. 17, 22 (1965); Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168,
37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment m
at 355 (1965); see Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d
69 (1960).
173. The issue is presently before the California Supreme Court in a case involving
a lessor's strict liability in tort for a defective ladder and an indemnification agreement
that provides: "Lessee shall indemnify Shell [Oil Company] against any and all claims
and liability for injury or death of persons or damage to property caused by or happen-
ing in connection with the equipment or the condition, maintenance, possession, or
operation or use thereof." Price v. Shell Oil Co., 274 A.C.A. 599, 608, 79 Cal. Rptr.
342, 349 (1969) (hearing granted).
174. Cf. Harvey Mach. Co. v. Hatzel & Buehler, Inc., 54 Cal. 2d 445, 353 P.2d
924, 6 Cal. Rptr. 284 (1960). See generally Comment, Contribution and Indemnity in
California, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 490, 494 (1969).
175. See Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal.
Rptr. 33 (1963). See generally Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts about
Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943).
176. See, e.g., Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 A.C.A. 224, 229, 74 Cal.
Rptr. 749, 753 (1969); Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 275 A.C.A. 1091, 1096, 80 Cal.
Rptr. 501, 504 (1969); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 92, 207 A.2d 314,
326 (1965). See generally Traynor, supra note 1, at 366-67.
177. Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 275 A.C.A. 1091, 80 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1969);
Tresham v. Ford Motor Co., 275 A.C.A. 456, 79 Cal. Rptr. 883 (1969); Shramek v.
General Motors Corp., 69 Ill. App. 2d 72, 216 N.E.2d 244 (1966).
178. See Prosser, The Consumer, supra note 10, at 20-21.
179. See Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 A.C.A. 224, 229, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749,
753 (1969); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 92, 207 A.2d 314, 326 (1965).
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Additionally, there are certain practical limitations to the land-
lord's potential liability that would arise where he had recourse against
the original builder or manufacturer either for his own injury'8 0 or
indemnity. 8' These practical limitations are illustrated by the builder
cases where the defects originated in the construction process and existed
upon delivery of the premises. Liability, however, arose only when the
defect caused injury. This would mean that the lessor's recourse against
the builder could extend over a considerable length of time. For exam-
ple, in Kriegler'82 a radiant heating system began to corrode before
the end of its normal service life, causing the plaintiff's injury eight
years after it was installed. In Avner'83 the defect causing the sub-
sidence of the lot was not wholly apparent for six years, and in Schip-
per... the failure to properly design a hot water mixing valve caused
the severe scalding of a lessee two years after the house was built.
These cases lead to the conclusion that the builder's liability is quite
extensive at least with respect to time' s ' and although none of the struc-
tures above could be expected to be eternal, his liability is a function of
the service life of the individual components of the premises.' 80 Where
one is defective and causes injury, the landlord's recourse against the
builder or manufacturer would extend for the same period of time.'8 7
An additional factor limiting the lessor's potential liability is that
time will also tend to increase the available defenses, particularly the
defense akin to contributory negligence or assumption of risk. 88 In
180. Cf. Murphy v. Sheftel, 121 Cal. App. 533, 9 P.2d 568 (1932) (action against
builder for latent defects in apartment building); Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc.,
269 A.C.A. 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70,
207 A.2d 314 (1965). See text accompanying notes 92-95 supra.
181. Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965) (in-
demnification for products liability); cf. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d
256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964). But cf. Russell v. George Rose & Co.,
276 A.C.A. 544, 80 Cal. Rptr. 755 (1969) (recognizing contribution, but holding no
implied indemnity from wholesaler or importer).
182. Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 A.C.A. 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969).
183. Avner v. Longridge Estates, 272 A.C.A. 695, 77 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969); see
text accompanying note 102 supra.
184. Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965); see text
accompanying note 96 supra.
185. Hale v. Depaoli, 33 Cal. 2d 228, 201 P.2d 1 (1948) (builder's negligence,
twenty years is not a limitation for a wooden railing).
186. See Aced v. Hobbs-Sesack Plumbing Co., 55 Cal. 2d 573, 583-85, 360 P.2d
897, 903-04, 12 Cal. Rptr. 257, 263-64 (1961). A manufacturer's liability to a home-
owner for a defective water meter may extend as long as 22 years. Rosenau
v. New Brunswick, 51 N.J. 130, 238 A.2d 169 (1968).
187. See text accompanying notes 180-81 supra.
188. This defense is identified and explained in Cintrone v. Hertz Leasing &
Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 456-58, 212 A.2d 769, 782 (1965).
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Schipper the plaintiff did not know, nor could he predict, that turning
on the hot water would result in the emission of what amounted to
live steam. Assuming, however, that no injury had ensued and that the
plaintiff was old enough to appreciate the danger, 89 he would have
realized that the hot water system was defective. This knowledge would
be a defense against any subsequent injury caused by that defect 90
and thus operate as a practical limitation on the landlord's liability.
Since it can be anticipated that the tenant in any leasehold will discover
potentially hazardous conditions during his tenancy, the passage of time
will tend to decrease the landlord's potential liability.
It would be tempting to limit the landlord's liability to defects that
were in existence at the time of delivery, but the language in Cintrone is
persuasive; the landlord should be liable for defects causing injury
throughout the term of the lease,' subject to the products liability
defenses discussed previously.'92 The landlord is in a better position
to detect and remedy defects because of his greater knowledge and
familiarity with the leasehold; he is also in a better position to bear the
loss. However, a distinction is justified where the parties contemplate
a longer term than the service life of the premises, as in a long-term
lease. In such a case the lessor's liability should be treated as if the
transaction were a sale of the premises. Making such a distinction
seemingly requires an arbitrary limitation. The limitation, however, is
based on what the parties would have anticipated the service life to be,
and whether they intended the lease to have the character of a sale.
The result would be to limit the lessor's liability to defects existing at
the time of delivery.
It is apparent that the age of the premises will also tend to increase
the lessor's individual liability, particularly where he continues to relet
the premises and permit defects to develop because of dilapidation. Un-
der these circumstances the lessor would be strictly liable to the tenant
without recourse to another party. In such a case liability would be
foreseeable, and the lessor could effectively limit his liability by inspec-
ting and communicating to the tenant what specific defects had
arisen. 9 ' For example, if the plaintiff in Schipper had known of the
189. This assumption is made for the purpose of simplification. In Schipper, the
injured plaintiff was an infant whose parents had occupied the premises for two days.
190. Cintrone v. Hertz Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 457-58, 212 A.2d
769, 782 (1965).
191. See text accompanying note 52 supra.
192. See note 53 supra.
193. A general warning concerning possible hazards would be insufficient since
its effect would be the same as a disclaimer. See text accompanying note 166 supra.
Where the landlord does know of a specific defect, however, and repairs cannot be
commenced immediately, effective communication would limit his liability in the in-
terim. But, if the landlord does not repair, such a defect could amount to a con-
structive eviction.
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defective hot water system, the landlord would have had a defense
against strict liability in tort.
It follows, therefore, that if the landlord elects to inspect and re-
pair, his practical liability may again decrease. For example, if the pre-
ventive repairs entail replacement of a hot water heater and the re-
placement proves defective, a third party cause of action in products
liability would arise194 against the manufacturer, 9 5 wholesaler, 9 ' re-
tailer 9 ' and installer of the defective heater. 9 " Although the lessee
could recover against these defendants as a user or bystander, here
again the rationale of Vandermark'99 should prevail and the injured
lessee should be permitted to recover against the landlord-lessor. This
is particularly true where the repairs preceded the tenant's lease since
the lessee may not have known that a new furnace had been installed or
who the responsible parties were. It has been suggested that the plain-
tiff should remain ignorant of possible defendants because it permits
the defendant to limit his practical liability by hiding behind the modern
methods of marketing. 20 Such a position is untenable, particularly
since the entire impact of the Vandermark decision was to prevent such
bewilderment and allow the plaintiff to recover against the party who
delivered possession of the defective product. 0 '
In the alternative, the landlord may disregard the normal serv-
ice life of the premises and permit certain dilapidations to go unrem-
edied thereby creating a risk of injury for the unsuspecting tenant.
Where the landlord does so with knowledge of the potential harm, the
courts in most cases would hold him liable even under the present law.20 2
194. See text accompanying note 172 supra.
195. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1963); Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305
(1965).
196. Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 44, 46 Cal. Rptr. 552
(1965).
197. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 896 (1964).
198. State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 912 (1967) (building contractor strictly liable for defective installation of
hot water heater); cf. Barth v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d 228, 71 Cal.
Rptr. 306 (1968) (installer of defective tire held strictly liable in tort, but distinguish-
able on the ground that the installer and the manufacturer were closely related).
199. See text at note 62 supra.
200. Conolley v. Bull, 258 Cal. App. 2d 183, 195-96, 65 Cal. Rptr. 689, 696
(1968); however, since Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 A.C.A. 224, 74 Cal.
Rptr. 749 (1969) questions the rejection of strict liability in Conolley v. Bull, the
reasoning is also suspect. See also Avner v. Longridge Estates, 272 A.C.A. 695, 77
Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969).
201. See text accompanying note 63 supra.
202. See text accompanying note 107 supra.
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In all other situations strict liability in tort will increase the land-
lord's liability, but as has been shown, this liability is not absolute. The
landlord is not an insurer. His liability can be effectively limited by four
factors: (1) inspection, (2) recourse against the manufacturer or
builder, (3) defenses developed in the products liability cases, and (4)
the requirement that a defect cause the tenant's injury.
Additional Considerations
What will be the social effect if the doctrine of products liability is
applied to the landlord-tenant relationship? Residential tenants as a
class of citizenry are composed primarily of America's poor. They do
not have the ability, either financially or educationally, to protest the
continued existence of defective housing." 3 Unfortunately, increasing
urbanization resulting from the industrial revolution is making this situ-
ation more acute each day. Its severity is inescapable, and as the United
States Supreme Court has recognized:
The need to maintain minimal standards of housing, to prevent
the spread of disease and of that pervasive breakdown in the
fiber of a people which is produced by slums and the absence of
the barest essentials of civilized living, has amounted to a major
concern of American government. 204
Although strict liability in tort would certainly tend to decrease the num-
ber of substandard units,20 5 it is not suggested as a complete solution to
the problem of slum housing. It is merely a single step toward accept-
able living conditions.
Admittedly, the imposition of strict liability on the landlord requires
a radical departure from the traditional rules applicable to owners of
property. Nevertheless, it is not the most radical. 06  In addition to
resting on a strong theoretical foundation, strict liability in tort as
applied to the landlord-lessor would share the decisional law that has
made the doctrine of products liability workable in the fields of chattels
and real estate.
The most popular argument against the application of strict liability
is similar to that which resisted its adoption and extension in other
fields of products liability: It will impose a tremendous financial bur-
203. See generally Sax & Hiestand, Slumlordism as a Tort, 65 MIcH. L. Rv. 869
(1967).
204. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 371 (1959); see Berman v. Parker, 348
U.S. 26 (1954).
205. See HouSING NEEDS, supra note 2; note 2 supra.
206. For example, Sax and Hiestand would recognize the rental of substandard
housing as an intentional tort akin to the intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Sax & Hiestand, Slumlordism as a Tort, 65 MicH. L. RFv. 869 (1967). See also
Blum & Durham, Slunilordism as a Tort-A Dissenting View, 66 MicH. L. REv. 451
(1968).
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den on the defendant. This has not been the case in the law of chat-
tels and there appears no reason why it should be any more valid in
the law of real property. 2 7 As a matter of logic, the antithesis of the
argument suggests the answer: What public policy condones the denial
of compensation to an injured tenant as opposed to protection of the
landlord who maintains defective premises? 20
Conclusion
Strict liability in tort is a refinement of the doctrine of products
liability and is firmly grounded upon two rationales: the principles of
implied warranty and risk distribution. It has been extended through-
out the manufacturing and leasing industries, and since the same socio-
economic factors are involved, it has been superimposed onto the law
of real property.
The law of landlord-tenant, on the other hand, has been inadequate
in its development. Although the lessee of a ladder can recover for in-
jury on the basis of strict liability in tort, the lessee of a house injured
by a defective staircase may have no remedy.
The courts must recognize that the business of leasing housing in-
volves the same health and safety considerations that led to the appli-
20121cation of products liability to the lessors of trucks,- ice machines, 2 O
and ladders.2  Such an application does not reach into vast, unex-
plored areas of liability, because, as Chief Justice Traynor noted be-
fore,112 there is a wealth of analogy to be drawn from the products
liability decisions. They contain for tomorrow the answer to some of
the problems that face us today.
R. W. Selman*
207. Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 202 A.2d 314 (1965).
208. Cf. Conner v. Great W. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d 850, 868-69, 447 P.2d
609, 618-19, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369, 378-79 (1968).
209. Cintrone v. Hertz Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965).
210. Sawyer v. Pioneer Leasing Corp., 244 Ark. 943, 428 S.W.2d 46 (1968) (im-
plied warranty under the Uniform Commercial Code).
211. McClaflin v. Bayshore Equip. Rental Co., 274 A.C.A. 487, 79 Cal. Rptr. 337
(1969).
212. Traynor, supra note 1, at 376.
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